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Habeas Corpus Relief Will Not Be Granted to American Citizens Seeking to Avoid
Prosecution in Foreign Sovereign Nations: Munafv. Geren
HABEAS CORPUS - IN GENERAL - NECESSITY, NATURE, AND SUFFICIENCY OF
RESTRAINT OR DETENTION - NATURE OF REMEDY IN GENERAL - The United States
Supreme Court found that while the United States courts do have jurisdiction over writs of
habeas corpus filed for American Citizens being held overseas by American forces acting as a
multinational coalition, the courts cannot enjoin the transfer of those citizens to foreign custody
or prevent their foreign prosecution.
Munafv. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).
The Multinational Force - Iraq ("MNF-I') is a multinational coalition operating in Iraq.
It is composed of troops from twenty six nations and led by the United States military at the
behest of Iraqi Government and the United Nations Security Council.2 This force is tasked with
humanitarian and military activities, such as the detaining of prisoners who threaten the security
of the new Iraqi Government. 3 While the government itself is responsible for the apprehension
and imprisonment of alleged criminals within Iraqi borders, the MNF-I has agreed to keep many
of those individuals in temporary custody, because many of Iraq's prison facilities have been
destroyed.4 Shawqi Omar and Mohammad Munaf (the petitioners) were prisoners at a facility
controlled by the MNF-I.
Petitioner Omar, an American citizen, was arrested in Iraq in 2004 for allegedly aiding
former al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi by collaborating with other terrorist groups,
escorting foreign fighters into Iraq, and coordinating kidnappings in Iraq.6 During the raid in
which Omar was arrested, MNF-I found explosives and other weapons, as well as other soldiers,
who were all detained. The other soldiers gave statements that implicated Omar in the terrorist
activity and the MNF-I designated Omar as a threat to Iraqi security.8 The Combined Review
and Release Board ("CRRB"), consisting of Iraqi Government officials and MNF-I officers, also
found Omar to be a security threat.9 He was then placed into the custody of United States forces
operating under the MNF-I. 10
After he was detained, members of Omar's family filed a writ of habeas corpus on his
behalf in the District Court for the District of Columbia.12 When the Department of Justice
informed Omar that the MNF-I was going to refer him to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq
1. Munaf v. Geren 128 S. Ct. 2209, 2213 (2008).
2. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2213.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id at 2213-14.
6. Id. at 2214.
7. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2214
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. "A writ employed to bring a person before the court, most frequently to ensure that the party's
imprisonment or detention is not illegal." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 589 (8th ed. 2005).
12. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2214 (citing Omar v. Harvey, 479 F. 3d 1, 4 (CADC 2007)).
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("CCCI") for further proceedings, Omar sought a preliminary injunctionl3 preventing his
removal from MNF-I or U.S. custody.14 The injunction was granted, and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, based on the fact that he had not yet been convicted in
Iraq.15 That court read the injunction to prevent Omar from being transferred or presented to the
Iraqi Government for prosecution, as well as to prevent the Iraqi Government from hearing
details concerning his possible release.1 6
Petitioner Munaf, of U.S./Iraqi dual citizenship, was kidnapped along with the group of
journalists he was with in Iraq.1 7  Once the group was freed, the MNF-I detained Munaf
believing that he was behind the kidnappings.18 After an MNF-I tribunal determined that Munaf
posed a threat to Iraqi security, he was detained and referred to the CCCI for further
proceedings. 19 The CCCI found him guilty of the kidnapping, but that verdict was vacated by
the Iraqi Court of Cassation (an appellate court) and remanded for further proceedings. 20
Meanwhile, Munaf's sister had already petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the
District Court for the District of Columbia.2' That court dismissed the petition citing lack of
jurisdiction, based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Hirota v. MacArthur.22  The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed, noting that they too were bound by the Hirota
decision.23 Munaf had already been convicted by a foreign tribunal, like the petitioner in
Hirota.24 The Supreme Court consolidated the Omar and Munaf cases and granted certiorari.25
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that: (1) United States courts do have jurisdiction
over writs of habeas corpus filed for American citizens being held overseas by American forces
acting as a part of a multinational coalition; however, (2) district courts cannot enjoin the transfer
of those prisoners to Iraqi custody or prevent their trial before Iraqi courts. 26
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.27 The Court first discussed
whether the district courts have jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petitions filed for Omar and
13. "A temporary injunction issued before or during trial to prevent an irreparable injury from
occurring before the court has a chance to decide the case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 650 (8th ed. 2005).
14. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2214
15. Id at 2214-15 (citing Omar, 479 F.3d 1). The Court of Appeals distinguished this petition from
that of the petitioner in Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (per curiam), because that petitioner had already
been convicted by a foreign tribunal. Hirota, 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
16. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2215.
17. Id.
18. Id
19. Id. at 2215.
20. Id During the CCCI trial, Munaf admitted both in person and in writing that he had facilitated the
kidnappings, but then recanted that confession. Id. After the remand, Munaf remained in custody pending the
further proceedings. Id.
21. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2215 (citing Mohammed v. Harvey (Mohammed), 456 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118
(D.D.C. 2006)).
22. Id at 2215 (citing Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1949)) (denying habeas corpus relief to
foreign citizens being held outside of the United States).
23. Id. at 2215-16.
24. Id. at 2216 (citing Mohammed v. Harvey (Mohammed II), 482 F. 3d 582, 583-584 (C.A.D.C.
2007)).
25. Id. at 2216.
26. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2213.
27. Id. at 2203.
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Munaf.28 It found that the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, does confer that jurisdiction to the
district courts, mainly because the prisoners were in custody of the MNF-I, a U.S. backed
force.29 Justice Roberts then differentiated this case from the Supreme Court's ruling in Hirota
by noting that the petitioners in Hirota were not American citizens and were not in the same type
of custody that the habeas statute describes. 30 He also noted that General MacArthur, who led
the international coalition in Hirota, was not subject to United States authority, unlike the MNF-
I.31 For these reasons, the Court declined to extend the Hirota ruling to this instance. 32
With the jurisdictional issue addressed, the Court moved on to the question of whether
the district court could enjoin U.S. forces from transferring detainees to a sovereign country's
custody for criminal prosecution.33  Justice Roberts began by noting that the Supreme Court
addresses such issues involving foreign relations very carefully, and rarely interferes with the
executive branch in military and national security affairs. 34 He then examined petitioner Omar's
case, specifically the preliminary injunction granted by the district court.35 Citing a long line of
precedent, the Court explained that a preliminary injunction is a drastic measure that requires the
petitioning party to demonstrate that success on the merits is likely.36 The district court had
granted and the circuit court affirmed the injunction based on the jurisdictional issues, which,
according to the Court, is not a satisfactory reason to grant a preliminary injunction.37 Thus, the
Court held that the district court abused its discretion by granting the injunction based on the
jurisdictional issues alone.38
Justice Roberts then noted that the errors from the lower courts39 would require reversal
and remand, which would ordinarily end the opinion.40 However, due to its nature, the Court
found it appropriate to address this issue on the merits, as well.4 1 After establishing the Supreme
28. Id at 2216.
29. Id. at 2216. The text of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 reads, in part:
The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is committed for
trial before some court thereof; or
(2) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States ...
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(1), (3) (2008).
30. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2216-17 (citing Hirota, 338 U.S. at 198).
31. Id. at 2217.
32. Id. at 2217-18.
33. Id. at 2218
34. Id. at 2218 (citing Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988)).
35. Munaf 128 S.Ct. at 2218-19.
36. Id. at 2219. (citing I IA C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948,
at 129 (2d ed. 1995); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944); Gonzalez v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 (2006) (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam);
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975))).
37. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2219
38. Id.
39. Id. Those errors stemmed from the lower court's decision in Munaf to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction and the lower court's decision in Omar affirming his petition for a preliminary injunction. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. Justice Roberts noted that "[t]here are occasions, however, when it is appropriate to proceed
further and address the merits. This is one of them." Id.
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Court's authority to address the merits of the claims,42 Justice Roberts began to examine the
substance of the two writs.43 Both writs claimed that the prisoners had a right not to be
transferred and that they were unlawfully detained.44  The unlawful detention portion served
essentially the same purpose as the non-transfer claim; both sought to avoid a transfer into Iraqi
custody.45 Here, Justice Roberts differentiated the normal habeas corpus petition from what the
petitioners were seeking.46 While the normal habeas claim seeks release from unlawful
detention, the petitioners were attempting to use the habeas claim to prevent being transferred
into Iraqi custody.47 The Court denounced this attempt, and established that Iraq, as a sovereign
nation, has a right to prosecute crimes committed within its borders. 48 All American citizens are
subject to this provision in any sovereign nation, even if the nation's criminal process offers
fewer rights than those of the U.S. Constitution.49
With this in mind, Justice Roberts then turned to the petitioners' due process argument.50
Citing authority from Wilson v. Girard," the Court confirmed the ruling that habeas corpus
could not be used to avoid the criminal jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign nation.52  The
petitioners' "release" claim was also denounced by the court, as Justice Roberts distinguished it
as a claim that sought not just simple release, but actual protection from the Iraqi Government.53
This would not only directly conflict with the Wilson ruling, the court noted, but also directly
conflict with the United Nations mandate requiring the MNF-I to help maintain stability and
security in Iraq. 54 Since the MNF-I was in direct collaboration with the Iraqi Government, the
Court reasoned that ordering a release from MNF-I custody would be the same as ordering a
release from Iraqi custody. Justice Roberts stated that such interference in a foreign
sovereign's criminal proceedings is akin to the already barred review of foreign convictions. 56
The Court concluded this section of the opinion by highlighting the constitutional executive
authority shown in Neely v. Henkel,57 and Wilson to transfer citizens who committed crimes in
foreign countries to those countries for prosecution.5 Justice Roberts reasoned that to hold
otherwise would be out of line with those decisions, and would intrude on the executive's
- - 59military operations.
42. Munaf 128 S Ct. at 2219-20 (citing City and County of Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S.
123, 136 (1913)).
43. Id at 2220.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id at 2221.
47. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2221.
48. Id. at 2221-22.
49. Id. at 2222. "When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country he cannot complain
if required to submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment as the law of that country may prescribe for its
own people." Id. (quoting Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901)).
50. Id.
51. 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
52. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2222 (citing Wilson, 354 U.S. 524 (1957)).
53. Id. at 2223.
54. Id. at 2223 (citing Wilson, 534 U.S. at 529).
55. Id. at 2223-24.
56. Id. at 2224 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 417-418 (1964)).
57. 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
58. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2224-25.
59. Id.
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The opinion then moved to the petitioners' contention that a transfer to Iraq would likely
subject them to torture.60 While the Court recognized the seriousness of this issue, it noted that
the issue was a political question and thus for the legislature to decide. 61 Both Neely and Wilson
provided that the sovereign right of a country to prosecute criminals within its own borders
should not be disturbed unless a treaty or some other diplomatic agreement required otherwise.62
Justice Roberts then noted that while the executive branch would be well within its power to
decline to transfer a prisoner if torture was likely to result, the petitioners only argued that torture
is a possibility, rather than a likelihood.63 The Court also explained that by that time, the State
Department had found that the prison and detention facilities which would hold the petitioners
had "generally met internationally accepted standards for basic prisoner needs." 64 The Court
again noted that it is not the job of the judiciary to question such determinations.65
After refusing to consider the petitioners' Foreign Affairs Reform and Reconstruction
Act claim, 66 the Court addressed the petitioners' final argument: that the government may not
transfer a citizen without legal authority. 67 The Court quickly dismissed the petitioners' reliance
on Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker,68 noting that case involved an extradition from
the United States, and that it would make no sense to hold that the government could not transfer
them to the country where they were already being detained, for that country's behalf.69 Justice
Roberts then dismissed the petitioners' contention that the Court's decision in Wilson supports
the argument that the Executive Branch lacks the legal authority to transfer a citizen absent a
treaty or statute. 70
Justice Souter concurred, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer.71 After briefly
summarizing the majority's holding, Justice Souter added that the Court could examine a case
where the Executive Branch is willing to knowingly transfer a citizen into a situation where the
probability that they will be tortured is well documented.72 He then noted that while this is
normally a political question, due process issues could arise if torture is well documented, even if
the executive branch does not acknowledge such proof.7 3 These issues, if they would arise, are
60. Id. at 2225.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2226.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. Justice Roberts noted that the Court would not consider this claim because it was not raised in
the certiorari filings before the court. Id. In footnote 6, the court briefly discussed the issues that would have been
addressed had the petitioners brought a claim under the FARR Act. Id. at 2226 n.6.
67. Id at 2227.
68. 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
69. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2227 (citing Valentine, 299 U.S. 5 (1936)) (holding that the Executive Branch
may not extradite a person from the United States unless an act of Congress or treaty gives the Executive Branch
the legal authority to do so).
70. Id at 2227.
71. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2228 (Souter, J., concurring).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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for the Court to consider.74 Justice Souter concluded by noting that while habeas corpus may not
be a remedy for such situations, there will be other options.75
One of the earliest cases examining the processes and functions associated with the writ
of habeas corpus is Ex parte Royall.76 In that case, petitioner Royall was indicted for selling a
bond-backed coupon without a license. The law required that he pay the state of Virginia
certain taxes on each sale and a tax immediately upon receiving the license. 78 Royall argued that
the law requiring him to pay the taxes on the coupons was unconstitutional. 79 At the time he
filed his petition for habeas corpus, he was in the custody of the sergeant of the city of
Richmond.80
Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. 8 1 He first considered the question of
whether the circuit courts had jurisdiction to rule on habeas corpus petitions where the petitioner
is held by state authorities on alleged breaches of state law.82 After examining the language of
the habeas statute, Justice Harlan determined that the circuit would have jurisdiction over any
petition where the claimant was allegedly being held in violation of his constitutional rights.8 3
He noted that the statute was worded in such a way that predicted situations involving habeas
petitions being filed to challenge the constitutionality of state imposed custody. 84 Any detention
that is possibly in contradiction with the Constitution is reviewable by the habeas writ, and state
authority would not upset this notion.8 5
Justice Harlan then considered whether the habeas petition merited relief.86 The statute
dictated that the petitioner would be entitled to relief unless it appears from the petition that the
petitioner was not entitled to relief. However, Justice Harlan noted that the Court is required to
uphold the ends of justice, even if that means suspending the release of a successful habeas
petitioner. Despite the fact that the circuit court had the jurisdiction to examine the writ and
order release if it found the detention unconstitutional, the circuit court was not bound to do so
immediately. 89 He concluded by noting that the circuit court would still have the authority to
review the habeas petition even after the petitioner has been convicted in a state court and thus
imprisoned. 90
74. Id.
75. Id See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). "Where federally protected rights [are threatened], it
has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief." Bell, 327 U.S. at 684.
76. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
77. Royall, 117 U.S. at 242-43.
78. Id
79. Id
80. Id
81. Id at 245.
82. Royall, 117 U.S. at 245.
83. Id at 245-47.
84. Id at 248-49.
85. Id at 250.
86. Id
87. Royall, 117 U.S. at 250.
88. Id at 250-51.
89. Id at 251.
90. Id at 253.
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The jurisdiction of the federal courts to review habeas corpus petitions filed by citizens
held by American forces outside of the United States now arises out of the statutory language of
§ 2241(c)(1).9 1 The Supreme Court examined the language of that statute in Wales v. Whitney,92
which was an appeal by a detainee whose habeas corpus petition to be released from an unlawful
detention was denied by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.93  In Wales, the
appellant Wales was imprisoned by the Secretary of the Navy and forced to stay within the city
limits of Washington D.C.94  The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia ruled that there
was not a significant restraint on liberty that would justify the granting of a habeas petition.95
Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the Court.96 He noted that a successful writ of
habeas corpus requires actual confinement, rather than just a restraint on where one can or cannot
go. 97 Addressing the statute, Justice Miller explained that when a prisoner is in custody, he is
under the control of the people who have the ability to produce him, and the writ should be
directed at that authority.98 Once that condition is satisfied, if the writ has merit it will be
granted, the Court held.99
In Munaf the Government unsuccessfully argued that the district court did not have
jurisdiction over the habeas petition because of the Supreme Court's ruling in Hirota v.
MacArthur.100 In Hirota, the court denied habeas relief to foreign citizens being held outside of
the United States.'01 The case involved two Japanese citizens who were being held by the
International Military Tribunal of the Far East after World War II.102 They were former high
officials of the Japanese Government and were found guilty of committing crimes against
103 104humanity. Both Japanese citizens filed writs of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court. The
Court denied the motion without an opinion. 05  In his belated concurrence, Justice Douglas
noted that the majority's decision may lead to troubling circumstances.1 06 He warned that the
Court's ruling did not carve out an exception for American citizens.1 07  Using several
hypothetical situations as examples,1os Justice Douglas explained that there should be jurisdiction
91. Munaf 128 S.Ct. at 2217.
92. 114 U.S. 564 (1885). While the petitioner in Wales was being held in the United States, the same
statutory language applied in that case as does here. Id
93. Wales, 114 U.S. at 565-67.
94. Id at 566.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id at 571-72.
98. Wales, 114 U.S. at 574.
99. Id.
100. Munaf 128 S.Ct at 2217 (citing Hirota, 338 U.S. 197 (1949).
101. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 198 (1949).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id at 198. The court reasoned that since the petitioners were being tried by a foreign tribunal, it
had no jurisdiction over the matter, and denied the motions to file the writs. Id
106. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 203 (Douglas, J., concurring) (per curiam).
107. Id. at 204. Justice Douglas noted that "I cannot believe that we would adhere to [the majority's]
formula if these petitioners were American citizens." Id. at 205.
108. Id. at 205. Justice Douglas laid out the following examples:
(1) Suppose an American citizen collaborated with petitioners in plotting a war against the United
States. The laws of the United States provide severe penalties for such conduct. May that citizen
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to ensure that habeas is an available remedy to the American citizens being prosecuted by
foreign tribunals. 1 09
About a year after Hirota was decided, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Eisentrageril0
again denied to extend habeas relief to foreign citizens challenging foreign detention.II That
case involved twenty-one German nationals who all were formally a part of the German armed
forces in China during World War II.112 Upon Germany's surrender, they were all tried and
convicted of war crimes by a Military Commission in China under the direction of the United
States Military.'" The former soldiers were sent to a German facility, which was at under
United States control at that time, to serve their sentence.114 The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia dismissed their petition for habeas corpus due to lack of jurisdiction,' '"
but that ruling was overturned by the court of appeals.116  Writing for the majority, Justice
Jackson ruled that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over writs filed by aliens who
have never been within the territorial boundaries of the United States. 117  He, like Justice
Douglas in Hirota, noted that this decision should not be read to apply to American citizens, as
those cases would raise separate issues." 8
An American citizen's attempt to avoid prosecution on foreign soil by filing a writ of
habeas corpus was similarly denied in Neely v. Henkel.119 In that case, Neely allegedly
embezzled money from the Cuban Government, in violation of Cuban law, while in the United
States. 120  After evidence of probable cause was produced, he was arrested and was in the
process of being extradited to Cuba for prosecution.121 Four days before the extradition order
was to be signed, he filed a writ of habeas corpus in order to be released from the extradition
proceedings, because, inter alia, Cuba's laws would not guarantee him the same rights as
be tried and convicted by an international tribunal and have no access to our courts to challenge
the legality of the action of our representatives on it? May he, in the face of the safeguards which
our Constitution provides even for traitors, have no protection against American action against
him?
(2) Suppose an American citizen on a visit to Japan during the occupation commits murder,
embezzlement, or the like. May he be tried by an international tribunal and have no recourse to
our courts to challenge its jurisdiction over him?
(3) What about any other civilian so tried and convicted for such a crime committed during the
occupation?
Id
109. Id.
110. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
111. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 763.
112. Id. at 765.
113. Id at 766.
114. Id.
115. Id at 767. The district court based its ruling on the Supreme Court's ruling in Ahrens v. Clark,
335 U.S. 188 (1898). Id
116. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 767 (citing Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (ruling
that any person deprived of liberty under the authority of the United States would be entitled to the writ if that
person could prove the imprisonment illegal), rev'd, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)).
117. Id. at 776.
118. Id at 769. Justice Jackson noted that "[w]ith the citizen we are now little concerned, except to set
his case apart as untouched by this decision . . .
119. 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
120. Neely, 180 U.S. at 112-13.
121. Id. at 113-14.
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guaranteed by the Constitution.122 The Circuit Court of the United States denied for the Southern
District of New York the petition.123 The Supreme Court heard the appeal, with Justice Harlan
writing for the majority.124 He noted that citizenship in the United States does not provide
immunity from foreign prosecution, even if that country's laws do not provide rights equal to the
U.S. Constitution.125 This proposition included both foreign countries and countries that were
still under the authority of or occupied by the United States. 126 Since Neely did not bring a
habeas claim that merited his release, his extradition was proper based on the power of the
Executive Branch. 127
Almost sixty years later, an American citizen again unsuccessfully attempted to use
habeas corpus to prevent prosecution in a foreign country in Wilson v. Girard.12 8 This case
involved an American soldier (Girard) who while stationed in Japan, killed a Japanese woman.129
Certain terms of a then recently ratified Security Treaty between the United States and Japan
established that Japan could exercise jurisdiction over the matter.130 Before he was turned over
to Japanese authorities, Girard filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia.131 The court denied that writ, but issued an injunction stopping his
transfer to Japan.' 32 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the injunction.133 The
Court held that Japan had the right to prosecute Girard because he committed a crime within
Japan's borders, and Japan had not surrendered its jurisdiction to do so.' 34
The possible relief available from a successful habeas corpus petition was detailed in
Preiser v. Rodriguez.'35 In this case, several prisoners in New York filed habeas corpus motions,
along with civil rights actions, when their credits for good behavior were revoked, effectively
increasing their prison sentence.1 36 The petitioners based their habeas petition on the premise
that by the time the petitions were ruled on, their original sentence prior to the taking of good
behavior credits would expire.'37 Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart noted that at its core,
122. Id at 122.
123. Id at 114-15.
124. Id.
125. Neely, 180 U.S. at 123.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 125.
128. 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957).
129. Wilson, 354 U.S. at 525-26.
130. Id. at 527-28. The relevant terms of the treaty stated:
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules shall apply:
(c) If the state having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the
authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The authorities of the State having the
primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other
State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of
particular importance.
Id at 527-28.
131. Girard v. Wilson (Wilson l), 152 F.Supp. 21, 22 (D.D.C. 1957), rev'd, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
132. Wilson I, 152 F.Supp. at 27.
133. Wilson, 354 U.S. at 530.
134. Id. at 529.
135. See generally Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
136. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 477-82.
137. Id.
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habeas corpus tested the legality of unlawful physical detention.138 He mentioned that a
successful habeas petition may not only provide immediate release from an illegal custody, but
also successfully prevents a future illegal detention.139  Thus, the Court reasoned, if the
restoration of the prisoner's good behavior credits only shortened their sentence, rather than
provide immediate release, habeas corpus could still provide the correct relief. 140
Justice Stewart's notion in Preiser that habeas relief may be available for future unlawful
detention stemmed from the Supreme Court's holding in Peyton v. Rowe.141 Peyton involved
two prisoners serving terms in Virginia.142 The first, Rowe, was convicted of rape and serving a
thirty-year sentence.143 He then pleaded guilty to an indictment of felonious abduction with
intent to defile and was sentenced to a twenty-year term to run consecutively with the thirty-year
rape sentence.144 Rowe petitioned for habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of the
second conviction. 145  Thacker, the second prisoner, was serving multiple consecutive
sentences.146 He also petitioned for habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of three of
the consecutive sentences he was serving. 147 The district court in both instances denied the writs,
ruling them invalid based upon the Supreme Court's ruling in McNally v. Hill.148 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit consolidated both cases and reversed, noting that they would not
adhere to the McNally ruling anymore.149 Upon Peyton's appeal, the Court granted certiorari.150
Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court.'51 After outlining the history
behind the habeas statute, he examined the Court's decision in McNally.152 In that case, the
habeas petitioner's motion to challenge an upcoming consecutive sentence made while he was
serving the first of the sentences was denied. 153 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
ruling, holding that since McNally was not currently serving the term he was challenging, there
was no illegal custody that could be defeated by a habeas writ.154 Justice Warren rejected that
application of the rule as being too harsh, since the delay involved in waiting for the consecutive
sentence to begin prior to ruling on the habeas writ would almost certainly be unjust to the
prisoners.155  He also noted that the holding from McNally was inconsistent with the habeas
138. Id at 484.
139. Id at 487 (citing Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968)).
140. Id. at 487. The petitioners in that case were denied relief, however, because they sought relief
from the Civil Rights Act.
141. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487 (citing Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968)).
142. Peyton, 391 U.S. at 55.
143. Id. at 55-56.
144. Id. at 56.
145. Id. Rowe alleged his second conviction was unconstitutional because he was subjected to double
jeopardy, the indictment was not valid, his guilty plea was involuntary, and he was inadequately represented. Id.
146. Id.
147. Peyton, 391 U.S. at 56.
148. Id at 57 (citing McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934)).
149. Id (citing Rowe v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967) ,aff'd, 391 U.S. 54 (1968)). In McNally,
the Court held that a sentence that had not yet begun to be served could not be challenged by a habeas petition.
McNally, 239 U.S. at 135 (1934).
150. Peyton, 391 U.S. at 58-59.
151. Id
152. Id. at 58-59.
153. Id. at 61 (citing McNally, 293 U.S. at 135 (1934)).
154. Id (citing McNally, 239 U.S. 131).
155. Peyton, 391 U.S. at 61-62.
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writ's principal goal: timely review of potential unlawful restraints on liberty.156 If the McNally
rule was applied in this case, the habeas petitions would not have been reviewable for at least
twenty years. 5 7 In concluding his opinion, Justice Warren noted that the habeas statute does not
deny the federal courts the authority to provide other relief than immediate release, as long as
justice is served.15 8
At first glance, the Court's decision in Munaf does not seem to be extraordinary. In fact,
placed in the backdrop of past habeas cases, the Munaf case follows the precedent set by those
previous rulings. The Court applied the habeas statute and ruled that the remedies sought by the
petitioners were not available by means of a habeas writ. 159 While the Court may have been free
to adjust the remedies available under the habeas statute,' 60 it chose not to do so. The Court was
well within its discretion to interpret the statute in this way. 161 Based in part upon the State
Department's satisfactory findings on Iraqi prisoner treatment, the majority opinion successfully
avoided the petitioners' argument that they may face torture.162 Chief Justice Roberts could
easily justify this decision, based on those findings, by noting that it was not the place of the
Judiciary to question such decisions of the executive. 163 What remains unanswered, however, is
what would happen if there was a greater possibility of torture to be endured by American
citizens. The Solicitor General only provided that prisoner transfer would be avoided if torture
was likely to result.' 64 Obviously, the legislature would take action to rectify such a scenario, but
petitioners in future cases similar to Munaf may not have the time to wait for legislative action.
If such a situation arose, the Court may be forced to consider extending alternate habeas relief
outside of what has already been provided while balancing the interest of not interfering with
criminal proceedings of foreign sovereigns.
As mentioned, previous rulings have suggested that alternate habeas relief may be
available to petitioners rather the normal remedy (immediate release) if such alternative remedies
would satisfy the aims of justice. 165  While the petitioners in those cases were not facing
punishments rising to the level of torture, the Court in each case thought that the habeas statute
was not offended by the alternate relief sought. 166 Even though both petitions in Munaf failed
on the merits,' 67 this opinion should not be read to cap the extent of habeas relief. The Court's
analysis in this case was simple: because Iraq is now a foreign sovereign nation and the U.S.
156. Id. at 63.
157. Id. at 62. Under the McNally rule, neither petition could be ruled upon until after 1990. Id.
158. Id. at 67. In holding so, Justice Warren cited three examples: Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 550
(1941) (holding that prisoner whose parole was revoked because of a second conviction could challenge the second
conviction despite the fact that he would not be released if he prevailed); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243
(1963) (holding a habeas petitioner who is paroled can still obtain relief from the parole conditions); and Walker v.
Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335, 336-37 (1968) (holding that a prisoner can challenge the first of consecutive sentences
despite the fact that he would still be imprisoned for the second sentence if he succeeded).
159. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2213.
160. See Hull, 312 U.S. at 550; Jones, 371 U.S. at 243; Walker, 390 U.S.at 336-37.
161. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2216-17 (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001)).
162. Id. at 2225-26.
163. Id. at 2226.
164. Id. at 2226.
165. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 158. In these cases, the petitioners were challenging unlawful future convictions
and conditions of parole.
167. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2223-25.
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does not generally interfere with the criminal proceedings of foreign sovereign nations, the
petitioners in this case were without recourse.1 68  The torture argument was essentially an
afterthought for the Court because of this completed analysis, and the Court could have ignored
it completely. But Chief Justice Roberts did not simply ignore that claim. Fortunately, the State
Department had already provided a way around the torture question. 169
However, had the State Department not established such confidence in the Iraqi prison
system,170 the Court's analysis may have left itself powerless to help the petitioners, and they
would be forced to wait for legislative remedies. This is so because the Court's reasoning
establishes that if a country is a foreign sovereign nation; there are very few reasons ("likely"' 7'
torture, for example) for the U.S. to interfere with the foreign country's criminal proceedings. In
terms of interfering with a foreign nation's criminal system because of the likelihood of torture,
the Court appears to have set a very high threshold to meet when faced with this possibility.' 72
In the future, the Court may be forced to adopt its own standards, especially if a similar
petitioner who could not establish the likelihood of such treatment does in fact end up being
tortured in a foreign criminal process.
In his concurrence, Justice Souter seemed to recognize the need for such a standard. 7 1
He hinted that the Executive Branch may not have the final say on determinations of prisoner
treatment and that the Court could step in, if necessary, to prevent a transfer.' 74 If the Court were
to adopt this hypothetical standard, the threshold required to establish the probability of torture
would seem to be lower than the "likely" standard established by the Solicitor General. Justice
Souter also noted that a habeas writ may not be the only option for petitioners in these
circumstances.175 While true, the alternative habeas relief provided in Hull, Jones, and Walker
indicate that the protective detention sought by the petitioners in this case may not stretch the
habeas statute out of proportion.176 Even though the type of relief sought was different in those
cases, what was common among them was that the Court was seeking to provide a just remedy to
the petitioners.1 77 If a similar case were to arise in the near future where the habeas petitioners
were again seeking unconventional habeas relief, the Court would be forced to determine
whether the pinnacle of habeas relief had already been reached, or if it could be extended still
further. Surprisingly, the petitioners did not base their arguments in part on Hull, Jones, or
Walker. 178 If they did, the Court would most likely have been more inclined to make that
168. Id at 2224
169. Id at 2226.
170. Id.
171. See supra note 164.
172. See infra note 179.
173. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2228 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter explained:
". . . nothing in today's opinion should be read as foreclosing relief for a citizen of the United
States who resists transfer, say, from the American military to a foreign government for
prosecution in a case of that sort, and I would extend the caveat to a case in which the probability
of torture is well documented, even if the Executive fails to acknowledge it."
Id at 2228 (Souter, J., concurring).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2228.
176. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 158.
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determination concerning the ultimate breadth of habeas relief. As of right now, however, that
inquiry remains unanswered.
If it were to be determined in the future that alternate habeas relief could reach the needs
of petitioners like Munaf and Omar, then the Court would face a balancing inquiry. The interests
of the habeas relief would have to be weighed against the general reluctance to interfere with
foreign criminal proceedings. While it has been established that the U.S. will not submit its
citizens to "likely torture",179 Justice Souter realized that a less stringent standard may be
appropriate. so Assuming hypothetically that such a standard comes into existence, and the
petitioners establish the probability of torture to satisfy that standard, the Court would most
likely then have to determine whether that probability outweighs the interests of preserving the
sovereignty of foreign nations. The decision will also have to account for the general apathy the
Court has shown towards citizens facing less than constitutional criminal proceedings in foreign
countries. While the latter contention would involve obvious due process concerns and should
not be a large hurdle to clear,' 82 the former would require a much deeper analysis. The Court has
yet to reach such an analysis; however, many factors would most likely be involved, including
but not limited to the current state of relations with the particular country where the citizens
would be tried and the history of prisoner treatment from that country. What is unsettling about
this analysis is that it may be impossible for a petitioner to prove the likelihood of torture to such
a degree that would outweigh both countervailing interests without an already documented case
of torture. That means one, or many, prisoners could be tortured before the likelihood of torture
could be successfully established, either under the Solicitor General's standard or the
hypothetical standard based on Justice Souter's opinion.
While some of the hypothetical possibilities presented in this analysis may seem
unorthodox and potentially implausible, it is important to remember the context from which they
could stem. Examining the growth of the Iraqi democracy is well beyond the scope of this case
note. However, it is safe to say that Iraq is still in its democratic infancy, and the stability of the
government, especially concerning prisoner treatment, should not be overstated. The Court's
opinions cannot be viewed in a vacuum, and external factors must be taken into account. Until
Iraq establishes itself as an effective and stable democratic society, the treatment of prisoners
will continue to be a concern. Justice Souter seemed to realize this in his concurrence, and left
the door open for the Court to provide appropriate relief in the future, unrestrained by the
Executive Branch if the petitioners could achieve a certain standard.18 3 It is possible that relief
could stem from the further extension of the habeas corpus writ, and that option seems to be well
within the Court's discretion, as long as the ends of justice are served. Unfortunately, it may
take a documented case of torture before the Court examines this issue further, and petitioners
like Munaf and Omar will be without adequate relief until that examination takes place.
Ryan Duty
179. Munaf 128 S.Ct. at 2226.
180. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
181. See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
182. Munaf 128 S. Ct. at 2228 (Souter, J., concurring). It is likely a due process argument would
succeed in such cases where torture was imminent.
183. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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